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Global Trends in 
Large-Value Payments
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
lobalization and technological innovation are two of the
 most pervasive forces affecting the financial system and 
its infrastructure. Perhaps nowhere are these trends more 
apparent than in the internationalization and automation of 
payments. The evolving landscape is most obvious in retail 
payments. The use of paper checks is in rapid decline or has 
been eliminated in most of the industrialized world. Credit and 
debit cards can be used in the most surprising places. Internet 
banking with money transfer capabilities is common, and 
several providers are competing to service consumers’ 
payments over the Internet and mobile devices. 
In wholesale, or interbank, payments, the effect of 
globalization and technological innovation is probably less 
obvious to the casual observer—but it has been equally 
impressive. Given the importance of payments and settlement 
systems to the smooth operation as well as resiliency of the 
financial system, stakeholders need to understand and assess 
the potential consequences of this evolution. This article offers 
an in-depth look at the current environment for large-value 
payments systems (LVPSs). We describe ten trends common to 
LVPSs around the world and identify the key drivers of these 
developments and the most important policy issues facing 
central banks (see box). Furthermore, we provide empirical 
support for each of the trends by using numerous publicly 
available sources, including Bank for International Settlements 
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• The evolving landscape in which large-value 
payments systems (LVPSs) operate is having 
important effects on the financial system.
￿ An analysis of the current interbank payment 
environment points to three forces that are 
shaping ten trends common to LVPSs 
around the world. 
￿ Technological innovation is making LVPSs 
safer and more efficient while allowing for 
new systems that are not limited to one 
country or currency. 
￿ Structural changes in banking—such as 
immense growth in the financial sector, 
changes in the role of firms and their products, 
and greater globalization of financial 
institutions and their services—are influencing 
the use of LVPSs. 
￿ The evolution of central bank policies is 
resulting in central banks becoming more 
active in monitoring existing and planned 
systems, assessing systems according to 
international standards, and inducing change. 
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(BIS) statistics on payments and settlement systems in selected 
countries (the “Red Book”). We focus on large-value payments 
systems in countries where the central bank is a member of 
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), 
a body under the auspices of the BIS (Appendix A). 
Technological innovation, structural changes in banking, 
and the evolution of central bank policies are the three main 
reasons for the recent developments in large-value payments. 
First, technological innovation has created opportunities to 
make existing large-value payments systems safer and more 
efficient. Such innovation has also accommodated the 
industry’s growing need for new types of systems that are not 
limited to a single country or a currency. Second, the financial 
sector has experienced immense growth over the last few 
decades accompanied by changes in the role of individual firms 
and the products they offer. In addition, financial institutions 
and their services have become increasingly globalized. These 
structural changes have affected how participants use large-
value payments systems. Third, the role of central banks in 
large-value payments systems has changed significantly in 
recent years. Central banks have become more involved in 
payments systems and have created formal and systematic 
oversight functions. The main focus lies in promoting safety 
and efficiency in LVPSs and in maintaining overall financial 
stability. Central banks therefore have taken more active roles 
in monitoring existing and planned systems, in assessing 
systems according to international standards, and, if necessary, 
in inducing change.
As the box illustrates, the ten trends that we describe can 
be assigned to three key drivers. The first four trends—the 
diffusion of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems, the 
take-off of hybrid systems, the emergence of cross-border and 
offshore systems, and the rise of Continuous Linked Settlement 
(CLS) Bank—are all associated with settlement technology and 
fall into the first category. Technological innovation has 
enabled new settlement methodologies to emerge that allow 
a better balance between settlement risks, immediacy, and 
liquidity requirements. RTGS systems have to a large extent 
replaced deferred net settlement (DNS) systems. However, the 
high liquidity needs associated with RTGS have led some 
system operators to explore liquidity-saving mechanisms and 
have motivated them to develop hybrid systems. Developments 
in payments system technology have also facilitated the 
emergence of systems that settle payments across national 
borders in one or more currencies. In addition, the clearing of 
payments is in some instances moving offshore and the ability 
of participants to connect remotely—eliminating the need 
for a physical “footprint” in the jurisdiction of LVPSs—is 
becoming more widespread. Foreign exchange (FX) settlement 
and counterparty risk are being managed more tightly in 
part because of the use of payment-versus-payment (PvP) 
mechanisms.1 CLS Bank operates a multicurrency payments 
system for the simultaneous settlement of both sides of a 
foreign exchange transaction on a PvP basis. With CLS Bank, 
existing risks associated with FX trades are virtually eliminated. 
The next three trends—increasing settlement values and 
volumes, shrinking average payment sizes, and falling numbers 
of system participants—as well as the emergence of cross-
border and offshore systems (Trend 3) fall into the second 
category. They are determined largely by how the banking 
sector uses payments systems and by the structural changes 
taking place therein. The values and volumes originated over 
LVPSs grew exponentially until the turn of the century. 
However, in terms of value, growth has since slowed and is no 
longer outpacing economic growth as measured by GDP. 
1 PvP ensures that a final transfer of one currency occurs only if a final transfer 
of the other currency or currencies takes place (Bank for International 
Settlements 2003).
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Because many LVPSs process a large amount of relatively 
low-value payments, the average payment size settled has 
shrunk. Hence, the dichotomy between small- and large-value 
payments systems is not always applicable. In addition, 
consolidation in the banking sector has led to fewer 
participants in LVPSs. Structural changes have also resulted in 
the emergence of global banks that require a global payment 
infrastructure, which in turn has led to the creation of new 
systems that accommodate these needs. 
The last three trends and the rise of CLS Bank (Trend 4) fall 
into the third category. They are associated with central banks’ 
operating policies regarding LVPSs. The service level of all 
systems is improving with longer operating hours. Some 
systems are even approaching a twenty-four-hour settlement 
cycle. Transaction costs in various LVPSs have been falling 
since the late 1990s because the savings achieved through 
improvements in operating efficiency have been passed on to 
system participants in the form of lower fees. Through the 
adoption of common standards, such as the CPSS’ Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payments Systems, risk 
management in LVPSs has become more standardized. 
Furthermore, the central bank community was the driving 
force behind the development of CLS Bank. 
We now describe each trend in detail and conclude by 
commenting on the possible future of the large-value payments 
landscape.
2.T r e n d   1: Diffusion of Real-Time 
Gross Settlement Systems2
As a consequence of the rapid increase in values settled in large-
value payments systems in the 1980s, central banks became 
concerned about settlement risks inherent in the then-
prevalent deferred net settlement systems.3 In particular, the 
banks were concerned about the potential for contagion (or 
even a systemic event) attributable to the unwinding of the net 
positions that would result if a participant failed to make good 
on its obligations when due.4
2 For more on these systems, see Bech (2007) and Bech and Hobijn (2007). 
3 A DNS system effects the settlement of obligations or transfers between or 
among counterparties on a net basis at some later time (Bank for International 
Settlements 2003). 
4 Unwinding is a procedure followed in certain clearing and settlement systems 
in which transfers of securities and funds are settled on a net basis, at the end 
of the processing cycle, with all transfers provisional until all participants have 
discharged their settlement obligations. If a participant fails to settle, some or 
all of the provisional transfers involving that participant are deleted from the 
system and the settlement obligations from the remaining transfers are then 
recalculated. Such a procedure has the effect of allocating liquidity pressures 
and losses attributable to the failure to settle to the counterparties of the 
participant that fails to settle (Bank for International Settlements 2003).
Over the last few decades, many countries have chosen to 
modify the settlement procedure employed by their interbank 
payments system with a view to reducing settlement risks and 
the potential for adverse systemwide implications. Most central 
banks have opted for the implementation of an RTGS system. 
Such a system reduces settlement risk, as payments are settled 
individually and irrevocably on a gross basis in real time, 
ensuring immediate finality. RTGS can also help reduce 
settlement risk by facilitating payment versus payment and 
delivery versus payment in the settlement of FX and securities 
transactions, respectively.
Fedwire is the world’s oldest RTGS system. Its origins can 
be traced to 1918, when the Federal Reserve inaugurated a 
network of wire communications among the individual 
Reserve Banks. In the early 1970s, the Fedwire system migrated 
to a fully computerized platform, and settlement in “real time” 
was achieved.
A number of western European countries began 
implementing RTGS systems in the 1980s. By 1988, RTGS 
systems operated in four of the six major currencies. RTGS 
adoption continued at a rate of roughly one country per year 
during the early 1990s. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht 
created the foundation for the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). A year later, the central banks in the European Union 
(EU) agreed that each member state should have an RTGS 
system. Furthermore, in 1995 it was decided to interlink the 
national RTGS systems through the Trans-European 
Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer 
(TARGET) system to facilitate the European Central Bank’s 
(ECB) single monetary policy and to promote sound and 
efficient payment mechanisms in euros. This decision led to a 
flurry of new systems and upgrades to existing ones. TARGET 
went live on January 4, 1999, and even EU countries that did 
not join the EMU at the outset (the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and Sweden) were allowed to participate in the 
Over the last few decades, many countries 
have chosen to modify the settlement 
procedure employed by their interbank 
payments system with a view to reducing 
settlement risks and the potential for 
adverse systemwide implications. 
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system. As the ECB made RTGS a prerequisite for membership 
in the EMU, prospective members in the rest of Europe began 
to implement RTGS. Furthermore, as hostilities ended in the 
Balkans in the late 1990s, governments began to rebuild their 
respective economies. They considered the establishment of 
sound and efficient financial systems a priority. RTGS systems 
were implemented with support from the EU, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. With ongoing 
projects in Russia and Cyprus, the diffusion of RTGS in Europe 
is nearly completed.
Outside Europe, the rate of RTGS adoption since the mid-
1990s has been equally impressive. Australia and New Zealand 
implemented RTGS in 1998. In Asia, the rate of implementa-
tion has been fairly steady; on average, about one country per 
year has adopted RTGS. Six countries in the Middle East have 
done likewise. In Africa, the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) spearheaded RTGS adoption in 1998. Through the 
South African Development Community (SADC),5 SARB has 
participated in developing and strengthening the financial 
infrastructure in the rest of southern Africa. As of 2006, eleven 
African central banks have implemented RTGS, many with the 
support of the World Bank.
In the Western Hemisphere, Canada is the only Group of 
Ten (G-10) country that has decided not to implement an 
RTGS system. Instead, Canada opted for a hybrid system.6
Uruguay was the first country in South America to adopt 
RTGS in 1995. By 2006, seven of thirteen South American 
countries had followed suit. Implementation in Central 
America and the Caribbean has started only recently, but the 
Inter-American Development Bank is assisting RTGS efforts 
in the region.
The global diffusion of RTGS systems since the mid-1980s 
is evident from Exhibit 1. By 1985, three central banks—
the Federal Reserve, Danmarks Nationalbank, and the 
Netherlandsche Bank—had implemented RTGS systems. 
A decade later, that number had increased to sixteen, but RTGS 
was still utilized predominantly by industrialized countries. 
In recent years, however, transitional as well as developing 
countries have begun investing heavily in improving their 
financial systems, and now RTGS is a common choice for 
interbank payments. At the end of 2006, 93 of the world’s 
5 The member states of the SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia. and Zimbabwe.
6 The Canadian Large-Value Transfer System (LVTS) processes payments with 
finality in real time, while settlement occurs on a multilateral net basis at the 
end of the day. Immediate intraday finality is achieved because settlement is 
guaranteed under all circumstances. This is facilitated by the use of collateral to 
secure participants’ intraday net debit (negative) positions and by a residual 
guarantee provided by the Bank of Canada (see Arjani and McVanel [2006]). 
LVTS is considered equivalent to RTGS in terms of finality, as the Bank of 
Canada provides an explicit guarantee of settlement in case of participant 
failure.
174 central banks were using RTGS systems. The RTGS 
adoption rate was about one central bank per year in the latter 
part of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. In the 
mid-1990s, the rate accelerated with the addition of three 
central banks in 1995 and five in 1996. Since then, the annual 
adoption rate has not dipped below three new central banks. 
It peaked in 2002, when a total of fifteen central banks 
implemented new RTGS systems.
3.T r e n d   2: Take-off of Hybrid 
Systems
As payments are settled individually in an RTGS system, 
sufficient liquidity needs to be available to fund each payment. 
Real-time gross settlement thus reduces settlement risks but 
results in an increased need for intraday liquidity to smooth 
nonsynchronized payment flows.7 
Initially, central banks provided intraday credit free to 
commercial banks. This policy is no longer considered a viable 
option by the banks, as it exposes them (and ultimately 
taxpayers), as guarantor of the finality of payments, to credit 
risk (see, for example, Humphrey [1986] and Bech and 
Soramäki [2005]). Thus, intraday liquidity is costly for 
participants either in the form of explicit fees or implicitly as 
the opportunity cost of collateral that participants need to 
pledge for an intraday credit line from the central bank. To 
reduce the need for intraday liquidity, several systems have 
developed different types of queue management and liquidity-
saving features. The queue management features include 
different priority categories for payments and the possibility 
of reordering payments once in the queue. The liquidity-saving 
7 Payments systems can operate at different levels of liquidity requirements, 
delays, and risks. Depending on the system design, these can be traded off 
against each other. Liquidity requirements are highest when payments are 
settled continuously against full cover (as in RTGS). Liquidity requirements in 
an RTGS system can be reduced by delaying payments until incoming 
payments allow settlement. In deferred net settlement systems, payments are 
settled only periodically by transferring only net amounts, thus payments are 
delayed from time of receipt until time of settlement. In such systems, banks 
can reduce delays by crediting customer accounts before final settlement. This 
will, however, come at the expense of credit risks, as final settlement may not 
take place as expected. For an in-depth discussion of these trade-offs, see 
Leinonen and Soramäki (1999).
To reduce the need for intraday liquidity, 
several systems have developed different 
types of queue management and 
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Exhibit 1
Diffusion of Real-Time Gross Settlement Systems Worldwide
Source: Bech and Hobijn (2007).
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Chart 1
Payments Settled in RTGS, DNS, and Hybrid Modes, 1999 and 2005
U.S. Dollar Equivalent
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; authors’ calculations.
Notes: RTGS is real-time gross settlement; DNS is deferred net settlement. Figures represent Fedwire, CHIPS, CHAPS, SIC, TARGET, MEPS, K-RIX, LVTS, 
PNS, Euro1, and HKD CHATS. DNS in 1999: Euro1 and BoJ-NET. Hybrids in 2005: PNS, LVTS, CHIPS, and RTGSplus. Systems are described in Appendix A. 



















features typically involve the netting of payments in the queue, 
a feature commonly referred to as gridlock resolution (see Bech 
and Soramäki [2001]).8 
Another approach to balancing risks, payment delays, and 
liquidity needs more efficiently has been the development of 
hybrid systems (see McAndrews and Trundle [2001] and 
Leinonen and Soramäki [1999]). Hybrid systems employ 
advanced settlement algorithms that combine components of 
both net and real-time gross settlement. Some payments may 
be settled individually, as in RTGS, while others, usually less 
urgent payments, may be pooled together and netted.9 Other 
features may include bilateral limits to manage credit 
exposures and reciprocity. The distinction between RTGS 
systems and hybrid systems can be fluid. In this article, hybrid 
systems are defined as systems with either separate payment 
streams for urgent or nonurgent payments and/or systems that 
8 Gridlock is a situation that can arise in a funds or securities transfer system 
when the failure of certain transfer instructions to be executed (because the 
needed funds or securities balances are unavailable) prevents the execution 
of a substantial number of instructions from other participants (Bank for 
International Settlements 2003).
9 For example, the RTGS share of the German hybrid system RTGSplus is about 
10 percent, whereas the netted payments share is 90 percent. 
employ advanced bilateral or multilateral offsetting algorithms 
on a continuous basis. Prominent examples of hybrid systems 
include RTGSplus in Germany, LVTS in Canada, CHIPS in the 
United States, and Paris Net Settlement (PNS) in France. 
With regard to settlement method, the major development 
in payments systems in CPSS countries has been the sharp 
increase in value settled by hybrid systems (Chart 1). In 1999, 
3 percent of payment value was settled by these systems. RTGS 
settlement accounted for approximately 50 percent of 
payments and DNS settlement for roughly 45 percent.10 
By 2005, hybrid systems accounted for close to one-third of 
value settled, whereas RTGS increased to almost two-thirds. 
The only remaining DNS system, EURO1, accounted for less 
than 3 percent of total value settled in CPSS large-value 
payments systems.
10 Prior to 2001, BoJ-NET provided both DNS and RTGS settlement modes. 
However, the RTGS settlement mode was seldom used by banks because of its 
higher liquidity costs. In 2001, the Bank of Japan introduced a reconfigured 
BoJ-NET and abolished DNS. Just before the change, only 3 percent of Japan’s 
wholesale payments were settled via RTGS (Selgin 2004).FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 65
4.T r e n d   3: Emergence of 
Cross-Border and Offshore 
Payments Systems
Large-value payments systems have traditionally settled 
payments in the local currency among participants located 
within the same national borders as the system. However, since 
the late 1990s, systems have emerged that allow payments to 
settle across national borders, facilitate settlement in multiple 
currencies, and permit participants to be located in a foreign 
jurisdiction. The two key drivers of the development of cross-
border and offshore systems have been the introduction of the 
euro and the demand for payment settlement in foreign 
currencies as part of payment-versus-payment FX transactions, 
particularly in the Asian time zones.
To analyze these new types of systems, we classify them 
according to the location of their participants and the currencies 
in which they settle payments. A simple taxonomy is presented 
in Table 1. The type of participants and currencies that a system 
services are each divided into three groups. Participants are 
categorized as domestic, remote, or cross-border, whereas the 
currencies settled are classified as local, foreign, or multiple.
We refer to participants located in the same country as the 
system as domestic participants. A remote participant has 
neither its head office nor any of its branches located in the 
country where the transfer system is based (Bank for 
International Settlements 2003). Cross-border participants are 
payees and payers located in different countries. The groups are 
not exclusive, as systems with remote or cross-border 
participants also service domestic participants. Further on, we 
distinguish between systems that settle in the local currency of 
the country where the system is located, systems that settle in a 
single foreign currency, and systems that settle in a set of 
multiple currencies that typically includes the local currency.
Fedwire and CHIPS in the United States, CHAPS in the 
United Kingdom, and BoJ-NET in Japan, to name a few, are 
traditional large-value payments systems that settle payments 
in the local currency for domestic participants. 
Originally, participation in the Swiss Interbank Clearing 
(SIC) system was limited to banks domiciled in Switzerland 
and the Principality of Liechtenstein. However, since 1998 
remote access to SIC has been granted to banks domiciled 
outside Switzerland. Any bank worldwide can participate in 
SIC as long as it meets the admission criteria (see Heller, 
Nellen, and Sturm [2000]). Among other things, remote access 
has allowed foreign banks that participate in the futures and 
options exchange EUREX to process Swiss franc transactions 
directly via SIC without having a physical “footprint” in 
Switzerland. At the end of 2006, of the 331 SIC participants, 
72 were so-called remote members. 
In 1999, with the introduction of the euro, two pan-
European interbank payments systems were introduced. 
TARGET and EURO1 both settle cross-border payments in 
euros. Currently, TARGET consists of 17 RTGS systems with 
1,058 direct participants11 (see Appendix B for more on 
TARGET and its individual components). In 2006, TARGET 
processed on average 326,000 daily payments worth about 
2.1 trillion euros (see Appendix C for more on cross-border 
payments within TARGET).
In conjunction with EU central banks’ efforts, the European 
Banking Association (EBA) established, much like CHIPS, a 
private sector complement to TARGET: the EURO1 system. 
Today, the system has 70 participating banks and processes on 
average 185,000 payments a day with a total value of around 
195 billion euros. TARGET and EURO1 are examples of LVPSs 
that settle cross-border payments in a local currency.
11 The systems are Belgium ELLIPS (Belgium), KRONOS (Denmark), 
RTGSplus (Germany), HERMES (Greece), SLBE (Spain), EP RTGS (Estonia), 
TBF (France), IRIS (Ireland), New BIREL (Italy), LIPS-Gross (Luxembourg), 
TOP (the Netherlands), Artis (Austria), SORBNET-EURO (Poland), SPGT 
(Portugal), Payments System (Slovenia), BoF-RTGS (Finland), and CHAPS 
(United Kingdom).
Table 1
Taxonomy of Payments Systems
Settlement Currency
Participant Type Local Foreign
Multiple (PvP in 
Foreign Exchange 
Settlement)
Domestic Fedwire, CHIPS, 
CHAPS Sterling, 
LVTS, RIX, PNS, 
BoJ-NET







Remote SIC Euro-SIC —
Cross-border TARGET, 
EURO1
CHAPS Euro CLS Bank, 
RENTAS-CHATS 
link
Notes: Systems are described in Appendix A. PvP is payment-versus-
payment.
The two key drivers of the development of 
cross-border and offshore systems have 
been the introduction of the euro and the 
demand for payment settlement in foreign 
currencies as part of payment-versus-
payment FX transactions, particularly 
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Chart 2
Annual Value Settled by U.S. Dollar 
Offshore Systems, 1999-2006
Billions of U.S. dollars
Sources: Hong Kong Monetary Authority; Clearing Corporation 










The United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark did not join 
the EMU at the outset. However, in expectation that these 
countries would eventually join, separate euro RTGS systems 
were built and connected to TARGET: CHAPS Euro in the 
United Kingdom, E-RIX in Sweden, and DEBES in Denmark. 
From the perspective of the Table 1 taxonomy, these systems 
can be thought of as facilitating cross-border payments in a 
foreign currency. However, with the advent of the next 
generation of the TARGET system, the euro functionality of all 
three systems will be phased out. E-RIX already closed at the 
end of 2006. 
Another implication of the common currency was the 
introduction of euroSIC in 1999. The system allows Swiss 
banks to conduct euro transactions. It operates on the same 
platform as the Swiss franc system, but settlement takes place 
on the books of the Swiss Euro Clearing Bank (SECB) in 
Frankfurt, Germany. SECB provides a link to the euro area by 
being a direct participant in RTGSplus, through which access 
to TARGET is established.12 In addition, remote access is 
possible in euroSIC. Within the taxonomy, euroSIC is a system 
that settles a foreign currency for domestic and remote 
participants.
CLS Bank operates a system that settles multiple currencies 
for participants located in different countries (we discuss it in 
more detail as part of Trend 4). A similar system is the link 
between the ringgit real-time gross settlement system in 
Malaysia (the RENTAS system) and the U.S. dollar real-time 
gross settlement system in Hong Kong (USD CHATS). The 
link, established by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and 
Bank Negara Malaysia in 2006, allows for PvP foreign exchange 
settlement of USD-MYR trades. In the Table 1 taxonomy, the 
link can be considered a cross-border PvP system.
Since 2000, several new systems that settle a foreign 
currency for participants located within the same national 
borders as the system itself have emerged:
￿ In 2000, Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Ltd. (HKICL) 
introduced the U.S. Dollar Clearing House Automated 
Transfer System (USD CHATS) to clear USD payments 
in the Asian time zone. The system is technically the 
same as the Hong Kong dollar CHATS system, except 
that settlement currently takes place on the books of 
a private bank (HSBC) in New York City.
￿ In April 2002, the Brazilian Bolsa de Mercadorias & 
Futuros (BM&F) FX Clearinghouse initiated operations 
for settling USD-BRL trades. The Clearinghouse 
maintains a settlement account in the local currency 
with the Central Bank of Brazil and settlement accounts 
12 Interestingly, the largest Swiss bank, UBS AG, processes its cross-border euro 
payments via proprietary access to RTGSplus and not via euroSIC (see the 
interview with Stephan Zimmerman, Head of Operations at UBS AG, at 
<http://www.sic.ch/dl_tkicch_clearit14interview.pdf>).
in the foreign currency with correspondent banks 
abroad. The transfer of funds takes place within the 
same settlement window.
￿ In April 2003, HKICL introduced EUR CHATS for the 
settlement of euro payments. The system is similar to 
USD CHATS, with the settlement bank being Standard 
Chartered in London. A novel feature of the combined 
CHATS systems is that it allows for PvP settlement of 
USD-HKD and EUR-HKD as well as USD-EUR foreign 
exchange trades. In the Table 1 taxonomy, this system 
enables the settlement of multiple currencies for 
domestic system participants.
￿ In August 2003, Clearing Corporation of India, Ltd. 
(CCIL), introduced a system that clears and settles 
interbank FX trades, including Indian rupee (INR) and 
USD. CCIL is a third-party member of CLS Bank and 
currently uses ABN AMRO in New York as its settlement 
bank.13
Many of these systems can be understood as substitutes for 
traditional correspondent banking services. The systems offer a 
customized local service in the native language, operating 
hours that accommodate their customers’ needs, and 
potentially better risk management through the use of more 
formal rules and procedures. 
We refer to systems that settle a foreign currency for 
domestic, remote, or cross-border participants as offshore 
systems. Offshore systems settling USD have experienced 
strong growth rates, albeit from a low initial level (Chart 2). 
All three USD offshore systems settled about USD 1,500 billion 
13 Other offshore USD systems in operation are the Moscow Interbank 
Currency Exchange in Russia and the Philippine Domestic Dollar Transfer 
System.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 67
in 2006. In euro offshore systems, growth has been more 
modest—especially considering the fact that the fastest- 
growing systems, CHAPS Euro and E-RIX, have been 
discontinued (Chart 3). All of the offshore systems (excluding 
CHAPS Euro), however, are still of smaller orders of magni-
tude than the smallest domestic LVPS in the CPSS countries.
5.T r e n d   4: The Rise of Continuous 
Linked Settlement Bank
Traditionally, foreign exchange settlement was carried 
out bilaterally between trade parties through the use of 
correspondent banking arrangements.14 Such arrangements 
lead to exposures because there is no direct link between the 
payment of the two currency legs; thus, there is a risk (called 
Herstatt risk) of paying the currency sold but not receiving the 
currency bought. This risk, combined with the vast size of daily 
FX trading and the global interdependence of FX markets and 
payments systems, raised concerns among central banks.
In March 1996, the BIS issued a report titled “Settlement 
Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions.” The report analyzed 
in particular the risks associated with FX settlement operations 
and outlined a strategy for reducing them. Based on this report, 
the G-10 central banks endorsed a three-track strategy to 
reduce these risks. First, individual banks were requested to 
14 Correspondent banking is an arrangement under which one bank 
(correspondent) holds deposits owned by other banks (respondents) and 
provides payment and other services to those respondent banks (Bank for 
International Settlements 2003). Correspondent relationships are sometimes 
formalized; the benefit is that parties to a trade do not have to know each other 
because the system’s rules replace individual agreements between them.
take measures to control their FX settlement exposures by 
improving their practices for measuring and managing 
exposures. Second, industry groups were encouraged to 
develop well-constructed multicurrency services that would 
contribute to the risk-reduction efforts of individual banks. 
Third, central banks committed themselves to encouraging and 
fostering private sector development in this field. They also 
agreed to improve national payments systems to facilitate 
private sector risk-reduction efforts.
Since 1996, there has been considerable progress on all three 
tracks of the strategy. In particular, the launch of CLS Bank in 
September 2002 was a significant move forward by the industry 
to reduce foreign exchange settlement risk. CLS Bank operates 
a multicurrency system that settles payments for participants 
located on every continent. As transactions are settled on a PvP 
basis, Herstatt risk associated with these trades is virtually 
eliminated. CLS Bank is a special-purpose U.S. bank supervised 
by the Federal Reserve and under the cooperative oversight of 
the central banks of the fifteen currencies included in the 
system. It has grown extremely fast and is on par with Fedwire 
and TARGET in terms of value settled (Chart 4). 
On March 19, 2008, CLS Bank settled a record 1,113,464 
payment instructions with a gross value of USD 10.3 trillion. 
CLS Bank has grown steadily since its inception as a result 
of increasing FX volumes, new currencies, and greater market 
penetration. It now settles more than USD 200 trillion per 
quarter and had surpassed both Fedwire and TARGET in terms 
of value settled in the second half of 2005. Chart 4 also displays 
the euro and USD values settled in CLS Bank. Whereas TARGET 
Chart 3
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settled five times the euro value settled in CLS Bank, Fedwire 
settled about 1.7 times the USD value settled in CLS Bank. 
Ten years after the strategy was launched, the Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems conducted a survey to assess 
the extent to which systemic risk had been reduced (Bank for 
International Settlements 2007b). The survey included 109 
institutions that represent 80 percent of the FX market in the 
fifteen currency areas.15
The institutions reported average daily gross values of FX 
settlement obligations totaling USD 3.8 trillion (Table 2). Of 
these obligations, 32 percent (USD 1.2 trillion) were settled by 
traditional correspondent banking arrangements and are still 
subject to settlement risk. Nonetheless, this is a significant 
improvement from the time of the 1997 survey, when an 
estimated 85 percent of the obligations were settled by this 
method. The major reason for the decline in FX obligations 
subject to settlement risk is the increasing use of CLS Bank. 
In 2006, CLS Bank settled 55 percent (USD 2.1 trillion) of the 
total FX settlement obligations of the surveyed institutions. 
Furthermore, 8 percent of FX obligations were settled by 
bilateral netting.16 Other settlement methods, such as the PvP 
arrangement available in Hong Kong’s USD CHATS and EUR 
CHATS systems or on-us settlement,17 accounted for the 
remaining 5 percent of obligations.
15 The survey updated and extended previous CPSS surveys conducted in 1996 
(Bank for International Settlements 1996) and 1997 (Bank for International 
Settlements 1998).
16 Provided it is conducted under legally robust arrangements, bilateral netting 
can also be a safe and efficient method for reducing settlement exposures (Bank 
for International Settlements 2007b).
17 In on-us settlement, both legs of an FX trade are settled on the books of a 
single institution (Bank for International Settlements 2007b).
Even though major progress has been made in reducing 
aggregate foreign exchange settlement exposures, the size 
and duration of the exposures still settled by traditional 
correspondent banking are significant. In its assessment, the 
CPSS recommends actions to address the remaining exposures 
that may continue to present systemic risk. 
6.T r e n d   5: Increasing Settlement 
Values and Volumes
Available data suggest that the values transferred over large-
value payments systems in Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems countries grew substantially during the 
1980s and 1990s. Table 3 summarizes the annual growth in 
nominal payment values in local currencies since 1985 for four 
systems for which such long-ranging data are available. In the 
United States, the number of transfers originated over both 
Fedwire and CHIPS grew by 6 percent per year on average from 
1985 to 2000. In terms of value, turnover increased by an 
average of 9 percent per year. Since 2000, both systems have 
experienced a slight slowdown in growth, with volumes 
increasing by 4 percent and 5 percent and values by 7 percent 
and 9 percent, respectively. 
Table 3
Annual Turnover Growth for Selected Large-Value 
Payments Systems, Nominal Values
Percent
Average Annual Growth
CHAPS Fedwire CHIPS SIC
Volume
1985-2006 14 6 6 11
   1985-2000 16 6 6 9
   2000-06 7 4 5 13
Value
1985-2006 17 8 8 2
   1985-2000 22 9 9 4
   2000-06 3 7 5 0
Sources: CHIPS; Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Bank of England; 
Swiss National Bank; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Systems are described in Appendix A. For SIC, the growth rates 
are calculated using data from 1989 to 2006.
Table 2
Total Foreign Exchange Obligations Settled,
by Method, 1997 and 2006
Percentage of Total Value
Settlement Method
Value (Trillions 
of U.S. Dollars)  1997 2006
CLS Bank (PvP)  2,091 0 55
Traditional correspondent





Total 3,821 100 100
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2007b).
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In the United Kingdom, CHAPS saw double-digit turnover 
growth in terms of volumes and values from 1985 to 2000. 
However, since the turn of the century, growth has decreased. 
In Switzerland, the picture is a bit different, as volumes have 
been growing faster since 2000. If growth is measured in Swiss 
francs, though, turnover since 2000 has been almost flat, at 
around CHF 45 trillion.
Chart 5 shows the annual turnover for Fedwire and CHIPS 
since 1985. Fedwire turnover increased from around USD 
100 trillion in 1985 to more than USD 570 trillion in 2006. 
Values settled in CHIPS were smaller than those settled in 
Fedwire from 1985 to 1988. However, between 1988 and 
1998, settlement values in CHIPS surpassed those in Fedwire. 
After settlement values in CHIPS dipped in the late 1990s,18 
they have steadily risen again and amounted to USD 395 trillion 
in 2006. 
A major determinant of the value of interbank payments 
is general economic activity. Since 1990, the combined 
settlement value on Fedwire and CHIPS has kept pace with 
economic activity, at around seventy times GDP (Chart 5, right 
axis). However, from 1985 to 1990, combined turnover on 
the two systems rose from forty-five times GDP to almost 
seventy-five times GDP. Likely explanations are technological 
development, deregulation of financial markets, and 
innovation in financial instruments.19
18 This point is addressed in more detail in our Trend 9 discussion.
19 Similar developments also took place outside the United States. Annual 
turnover in the United Kingdom’s CHAPS system rose from seven times GDP in 
its first full year of operation, 1985, to more than fifty times GDP at the turn of 
the century. In Switzerland, annual turnover reached 120 times GDP in 1997; 
it has since fallen to around 90 times GDP in 2006, the same level as in 1989.
Chart 6 shows the relative importance of the CPSS 
countries’ interbank payments systems in terms of value 
settled. Currently, the three largest systems represent more 
than 75 percent of value transferred. The six largest systems 
represent almost 95 percent. The largest individual LVPS is 
TARGET, with an annual settlement value of EUR 489 trillion 
(USD 607 trillion). The two U.S. systems, Fedwire and CHIPS, 
respectively rank second and third. However, their combined 
share of turnover, 45 percent, exceeds the share of combined 
turnover of the euro payments systems TARGET and EURO1, 
34 percent.
The number of transfers settled increased in all of the 
CPSS countries’ payments systems (Chart 7). The Swiss 
SIC system stands out, with more than 250 million payments 
settled in 2005. SIC is notable because there is no separate 
system for settling retail payments in the Swiss payment 
infrastructure. Thus, retail as well as wholesale payments are 
settled in SIC. (The settlement of low-value payments in LVPSs 
Chart 5
Time Series of Value of Transfers in CHIPS 
and Fedwire since 1985
Trillions of U.S. dollars
Sources: CHIPS; Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ 
calculations.
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is discussed in more detail in the next section.) Fedwire settled 
the second highest number of transactions, 132 million. In 
2005, TARGET settled 72 million transactions and CHIPS 
settled 76 million. 
7.T r e n d   6: Shrinking Average 
Payment Sizes
Payments processed through large-value payments systems 
come in many sizes. The maximum value of a payment allowed 
over Fedwire is one cent less than USD 10 billion; on occasion, 
payments of less than USD 1 are processed. In fact, most LVPSs 
process a significant amount of relatively low-value payments. 
As a result, the dichotomy between small-value (retail) and 
large-value (wholesale) payments systems is often blurred. In 
Fedwire and CHIPS, the median payment size is less than USD 
35,000, and almost two-thirds of transfers are for amounts less 
than USD 100,000. Hence, both systems are important for 
making low-value payments. The appeal of making low-value 
transfers in Fedwire derives from the speed, certainty, and 
finality of settlement and, in some cases, from the ease of 
reconciliation.20 In addition, the value distribution has a fat 
right-hand tail. In other words, a small number of payments 
account for a large share of value. In Fedwire, 5 percent of the 
largest payments account for 95 percent of the total value. 
The considerable use of low-value wire transfers is not just a 
U.S. phenomenon. The distribution of payments handled in 
the Canadian LVTS is similar to that of the U.S system. The 
mean value is CDN 8 million (USD 6.6 million), while the 
median value is about CDN 50,000 (USD 41,300). In the 
United Kingdom, the mean value of wire transfers processed by 
CHAPS Sterling is GBP 1.9 million (USD 3.45 million), and the 
median value is estimated to be approximately GBP 25,000 
(USD 45,500). The bulk of payments in Switzerland’s SIC 
system is less than CHF 5,000 (USD 4,000).
Looking across large-value payments systems in CPSS 
countries, we observe a remarkable dispersion in average 
payment value (Chart 8). In BoJ-NET, the average payment 
was in excess of 3.8 billion JPY (USD 35 million) in 2005—the 
highest among the LVPSs surveyed and three times larger than 
the second-ranking K-RIX system of the Swedish Riksbank. 
Nonetheless, this is a significant drop from 1999, when the 
20 See Federal Reserve Board, “A Summary of the Roundtable Discussion on 
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average payment value was more than JPY 6,941 million (USD 
63 million). The drop is attributable to the change from a 
deferred net settlement to a real-time gross settlement system 
in 2001. An upper limit of JPY 5 billion per payment was set to 
allow for smoother settlement in the new RTGS system. 
TARGET is ranked third and followed by the North American 
systems. At the other end of the spectrum is the SIC system, 
with SFR 160,000 (USD 130,000), along with the euro systems 
PNS (USD 2.9 million) and EURO1 (USD 1.2 million).
Adjusting for inflation, Chart 9 shows that the average 
payment size has fallen for most systems from 1999 to 2005. 
For five of the twelve systems, it fell more than 40 percent. 
For Fedwire and TARGET, the average size has remained 
unchanged. The only increase in payment size adjusted for 
inflation occurred in the HKD CHATS system; it is to a large 
extent attributable to the period of deflation that Hong Kong 
experienced between 1999 and 2004.21 
21 The consumer price index in Hong Kong fell 12 percent between 1999 
and 2004.
8.T r e n d   7: Falling Numbers 
of System Participants
One of the most pervasive trends in international banking 
is consolidation. All else equal, larger banks imply fewer 
participants in LVPSs. In addition, an increasing focus on costs 
has made banks more selective in terms of the systems in which 
they participate. It is no longer considered “a must” for many 
foreign banks to clear their USD payments themselves as it was 
in the 1980s and 1990s. However, technological advances have 
made it possible to participate in more systems in new ways, 
as we describe in the emergence of cross-border and offshore 
systems (Trend 3).
According to figures reported to the Bank for International 
Settlements as part of its “Red Book” statistics, Fedwire had 
10,000 participants in the late 1990s and 6,819 participants in 
2005. Despite this decrease, Fedwire is still by far the largest 
LVPS in the CPSS group. The second largest system is 
TARGET, with 2,628 participants. With only twelve direct 
participants, the Canadian LVTS is the smallest system in the 
CPSS group (Table 4). 
Most LVPSs in the CPSS group saw participation decline 
from 1999 to 2005 (Table 4). However, there was a substantial 
Chart 9
Inflation-Adjusted Change in Average 
Payment Size for CPSS Countries’ 
Large-Value Payments Systems, 
1999-2005
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; authors’ 
calculations.
Notes: Systems are described in Appendix A. CPSS is 
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems.
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Fedwire 1   9,994 1   6,819 -32
TARGET 2   5,144 2   2,628 -49
BoJ-NET 3 409 3 357 -13
SIC 5 291 4 325 12
CHAPS 4 404 5 241 -40
HKD CHATS 6 151 6 129 -15
MEPS 7 136 7 111 -18
EURO1 9 72 8 75 4
CHIPS 8 77 9 48 -38
PNS 10 25 10 45 80
K-RIX 11 23 11 21 -9
LVTS 12 14 12 15 7
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Systems are described in Appendix A. CPSS is the Committee 
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increase in the number of participants in SIC and, even more 
so, in PNS.22 SIC’s growth in participation is attributable to its 
opening to “remote membership” in 1998 (see our Trend 3 
discussion). The number of remote participants in SIC has 
since increased, whereas the number of Swiss participants has 
remained largely unchanged. 
9.T r e n d   8: Extended Operating Hours
A direct effect of the globalization of financial markets is the 
extension of operating hours in large-value payments systems. 
Between 1997 and 2005, there were two waves of operating 
hour extensions in CPSS countries’ large-value payments 
systems. The first occurred in 1998 and 1999, when several 
European LVPSs changed or extended their operating hours to 
coincide with TARGET’s business hours. The second wave 
coincided with the launch of CLS Bank in 2002. BoJ-NET, 
MEPS, and LVTS extended their operating hours to 
22 For PNS, the increase in participants is attributable to an increase in the 
number of indirect participants; by and large, it can be explained by a 
reclassification of their status that took place over the period.
synchronize with CLS Bank settlement hours during the 
European morning. The CLS Bank settlement process takes 
place during a five-hour window from 7:00 a.m. to noon 
(CET). Its operating hours partially overlap the operating 
hours of all the participating RTGS systems (Chart 10).
To meet industry requests to achieve greater overlap of U.S. 
wholesale payments system operating hours with those of the 
Asia-Pacific markets, Fedwire and CHIPS expanded their 
operating hours in 1997 and 2004. In both instances, the 
opening was moved to earlier while the closing remained 
unchanged. 
In 2007, SIC had the longest operating hours—23 hours and 
15 minutes—approaching a twenty-four-hour settlement 
cycle. The three North American systems—Fedwire, CHIPS, 
Chart 10
Opening Hours of CLS Bank and Selected CPSS Countries’ Large-Value Payments Systems
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The blue and black shading represents the operating hours in 1996 or when the system was implemented. The full extent of all shaded areas 
(excluding the black areas, which represent opening hour shortenings in 1999 and before) is operating hours in 2005. Green shading indicates 
extensions in 1999 and before; grey shading shows extensions after 1999. Systems are described in Appendix A.
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Chart 11
Length of Operating Hours of Selected CPSS
Countries’ Large-Value Payments Systems,
1997 and 2007
Time
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; authors’ 
calculations.
Notes: Systems are described in Appendix A. CPSS is 
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems.















and LVTS—followed with 21.5, 20, and 17.5 hours, respec-
tively. At the other end of the spectrum were the European 
systems PNS and EURO1 and the Asian systems MEPS and 
HKD CHATS, with operating hours of between 8 and 
9.5 hours. A reduction in operating hours occurred only in 
the Singaporean system MEPS and, to a lesser extent, in the 
French PNS system (Chart 11). 
10.T r e n d   9: Declining 
Transaction Fees
Large-value payments systems are characterized by large 
economies of scale, as there are considerable fixed costs in 
terms of setting up and maintaining the systems. In contrast, 
individual payments generate diminutive costs. This creates 
a potential problem for efficient pricing. Standard economic 
theory suggests that each transaction should be priced at its 
marginal cost. However, marginal cost pricing implies that 
the fixed costs are not recovered (see Holthausen and Rochet 
[2006]). Central banks and system operators around the 
world have found different solutions to this challenge, 
depending on their mandate for the provision of payment 
services. 
Most systems charge a fixed membership or admission fee 
and the majority charge a per-transaction fee. However, 
differences exist in terms of whether both the originator and 
the receiver are charged for a transaction. TARGET only 
charges the originator whereas both Fedwire and SIC levy 
fees on both the originator and the receiver. A simple, flat 
transaction fee schedule is often used, but several systems 
base the fee on a combination of the volume submitted by 
the participant, the value of the particular payment, the 
submission time of the payment, and the mode of delivery, 
such as online and offline. In addition, participants may 
have to pay separate communications charges, for example, 
to SWIFT. 
In 1999, the Federal Reserve implemented a volume-based 
fee schedule to reflect more accurately the cost structure of 
Fedwire services and its demand elasticity. This type of 
structure remains in place today, in which offline participants 
are also assessed a surcharge to initiate or receive a funds 
transfer. In Switzerland, the originator of the payment is 
charged differently depending both on the time when the 
payment is submitted and its value. The SIC pricing schedule 
is illustrated in Table 5. The receiver is charged a flat fee 
regardless of the settlement time and value. The fee structure 
provides an incentive for early input and settlement of 
payments, which in turn prevents the demand for settlement 
from peaking at the end of the day (see Heller, Nellen, and 
Sturm [2000]). For cross-border payments, TARGET has 
a transparent, volume-based pricing structure. Domestic 
payments are currently priced by each TARGET component 
independently. 
In the second half of the 1990s, the Federal Reserve 
undertook a five-year project—akin to the current TARGET2 
initiative—to consolidate its processing facilities. The project 
resulted in significant savings that were passed on to users in 
the form of lower fees. The average transaction fee (nominal) 
Large-value payments systems are 
characterized by large economies of 
scale, as there are considerable fixed 
costs in terms of setting up and 
maintaining the systems. In contrast, 
individual payments generate diminutive 
costs. This creates a potential problem 
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Chart 12
The Effect of Fedwire Price Reductions 
on CHIPS Volume
Index: 1990 = 100
Sources: CHIPS; Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ 
calculations.
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in Fedwire dropped from USD 0.50 in 1996 to less than USD 
0.16 in 2006—a reduction of 68 percent (Chart 12). SIC 
participants have seen a similar drop, as the average transaction 
fee fell from 17 centimes in 1999 to 7 centimes in 2005—a 
reduction of 60 percent. TARGET transaction fees have been 
fixed at the same nominal rates since 1999. 
Pricing in LVPSs is important not only from a revenue and 
cost perspective but also from a competitive perspective when 
private and public systems co-exist as they do in Europe and 
the United States. As an example, the growth in the respective 
volumes of payments submitted to Fedwire and CHIPS since 
1990 is illustrated in Chart 12. Both systems have more than 
doubled the amount of payments they process. However, 
the trajectory of volumes processed over CHIPS declined 
significantly in the late 1990s and did not recover until 2001. At 
the same time, Fedwire was experiencing steady growth. This 
change coincides with the reduction in Fedwire fees and the 
move to volume-based pricing. Conversely, in late 2005, 
CHIPS announced new incentive pricing for existing and new 
participants. Based on one year of data, incentive pricing 
appears to have had some effect, as Fedwire volume grew by 
only 1 percent—the lowest rate in twenty years—while CHIPS 
volume grew by 9 percent.
11.T r e n d   10: Adoption of Common 
Standards for Large-Value 
Payments Systems
In 1980, the governors of the central banks of the G-10 
countries established the Group of Experts on Payment 
Systems. One of the Group’s first projects was to conduct a 
detailed review of payments system developments in the G-10 
countries. It was published by the BIS in 1985 in the first of a 
series that has become known as the “Red Book.” The Group 
also analyzed interbank netting schemes in the Angell Report 
(“Report on Netting Schemes”) and in the Lamfalussy Report 
(“Report of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes of 
the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries”), published 
by the BIS in 1989 and 1990, respectively. In 1990, the G-10 
governors established the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems to assume and extend the activities of the 
Group of Experts on Payment Systems. The CPSS was set up as 
one of the BIS’ permanent central bank committees reporting 
to the G-10 governors.
Table 5
Pricing Principles in Fedwire, TARGET, and SIC
Transaction Fee (U.S. Dollar Equivalent)
Lowest Highest
Volume-Based Value-Based Time of Day
Mode of 
Delivery Sender Total Sender Total
Fedwire YNNY 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6
TARGET YNNN 1.1 1.1 2.4 2.4
SIC NYYN 0.01 0.03 3.7 3.7
Sources: European Central Bank; Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Swiss National Bank. 
Note: Total = sender + receiver, exchange rate of May 25, 2007.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 75
The CPSS has focused on disseminating information on 
payments system design and has been defining payment norms 
and best practices for the central bank community. In 1997, the 
CPSS published a report on real-time gross settlement systems 
and in 2005 a report on new developments in large-value 
payments systems that focused on changes since the RTGS 
report. Furthermore, in January 2001, the CPSS published 
the “Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment 
Systems.” The document was developed to serve as guidelines 
for promoting safety and efficiency in the design and operation 
of systemically important payments systems (SIPSs).23
The standards published by the CPSS provide the main 
principles for the design and operation of payments and 
settlement systems. They are currently being used as a reference 
by central banks and international organizations in their efforts 
to improve the safety and efficiency of payments systems 
worldwide. They are part of a set of key standards that the 
international community considers essential to strengthening 
and preserving financial stability. As such, these standards are 
used by the joint IMF and World Bank Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) and the Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes. 
A growing number of LVPSs around the world have been 
assessed according to the Core Principles. This has occurred 
either as a self-assessment by the system operator, the central 
bank, or as part of an FSAP review. In some cases, systems have 
even been self-assessed and assessed by the IMF and the World 
Bank. Some central banks, such as the Bank of England and the 
Swedish Riksbank, use the Core Principles for annual 
assessments of their SIPSs as part of their payments system 
oversight. 
The first country to assess its payments system according 
to the Core Principles was Canada. In late 1999, Canada 
participated in an FSAP pilot that included an assessment of the 
Canadian payments system, LVTS, using a draft version of the 
Core Principles. The payments systems in Cameroon and 
23 A payments system is systemically important when, if the system were 
insufficiently protected against risk, disruption within it could trigger or 
transmit further disruptions among participants or systemic disruptions in 
the financial area more widely (Bank for International Settlements 2003).
Estonia were assessed in 2000. In January 2001, the Governing 
Council of the European Central Bank adopted the Core 
Principles as the minimum standards for the Eurosystem’s 
common oversight policy on systemically important payments 
systems. As a consequence, the Governing Council decided that 
all nineteen SIPSs in the euro area would be assessed against the 
Core Principles in mid-2003. 
Exhibit 2 on the next page displays the countries that have 
applied the Core Principles to assess their LVPSs. At the end of 
2006, fifty-nine countries had done so—up from twenty-two at 
the end of 2002. Of the fifty-nine countries, twelve had been 
both self-assessed and under the scrutiny of the IMF and World 
Bank. In addition, payments systems in another forty-two 
countries had been assessed as part of an FSAP review, while 
five had conducted self-assessments. The United States belongs 
to the latter group.
According to the assessments, practically all SIPSs in 
developed countries meet the standards and codes in the Core 
Principles. This is also true for payments systems in many 
emerging economies. Private sector payments systems in major 
currencies also comply with the Core Principles; notable 
examples are CHIPS and EURO1.
12.F u t u r e  D e v e l o p m e n t s
This article describes ten long-range trends in the settlement of 
large-value payments. The questions worth considering are 
how these trends will evolve and what new developments can 
be foreseen. We offer some thoughts on these questions.
Currently, the diffusion of RTGS is well under way. RTGS 
and net settlement systems each have characteristics that make 
them desirable, thus the hybridization of RTGS is likely to 
continue as long as liquidity is costly. Many central banks 
require collateral for intraday credit. With the ongoing 
development of financial markets, collateral is likely to find 
new, more profitable uses than payment settlement. This will 
likely drive the cost of liquidity up and, as a consequence, 
increase the demand for liquidity saving that netting and 
offsetting in conjunction with RTGS can offer. The trend 
toward greater hybridization of systems is therefore likely 
to continue.
The introduction of cross-border systems has been 
associated with unique events linked to the introduction of the 
euro and the establishment of CLS Bank. Cross-border systems 
are likely to remain rare in the future. However, remote 
participation may become more prevalent. 
Offshore systems that settle a foreign currency are presently 
small and serve niche markets—mainly a local FX market or 
The standards published by the CPSS 
[Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems] provide the main principles for 
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Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); websites of countries’ central banks.
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the needs of banks in the area and time zone to settle payments 
in a foreign currency among each other. Such demands may 
arise in the context of the establishment of new financial 
centers, for instance, in the Middle East or China, where the 
People’s Bank of China is developing a USD clearing system. 
Most existing or planned offshore systems are limited to a 
single country. With improvements in information and 
communications technologies, the fixed cost of setting up such 
systems is being reduced. As a consequence, we may see more 
offshore systems emerge, but they are likely to remain niche 
players, much like the existing ones are.
CLS Bank settlements have grown rapidly and are likely 
to continue to do so. Currently, CLS Bank captures around 
50 percent of all FX trades and is pursuing the settlement of 
other types of transactions. As most of its costs stem from fixed 
investments, CLS Bank has incentives to continue fostering 
growth in settlement volumes.
Settlement values are likely to continue growing at the pace 
of GDP in the long run, and be cyclical to financial market 
activity in the short run—as they have done over the past ten 
years. The rapid growth in values attributable to financial 
deregulation and innovation in the 1980s and early 1990s has 
largely been absorbed.
The average real value of payments processed in LVPSs has 
declined. As transaction prices seem to be declining too, it can 
be expected that the benefits of real-time settlement will 
outweigh the costs for a wider variety of smaller financial 
transactions. Thus, we expect that the average value of large-
value payments will continue to fall. 
Consolidation in financial services is continuing. Especially 
in Europe, the process of cross-border mergers has not yet 
taken off. In addition, the introduction of TARGET2 and the 
consolidation of all the EU RTGS systems into a single entity 
will substantially reduce the number of LVPS participants, as 
banks operating in several EU countries will be better 
positioned to manage their payments centrally. 
One reason for the emergence of offshore systems is that the 
operating hours of domestic LVPSs do not coincide with the 
business hours of LVPSs in other countries. Often, the 
operating hours of euro or U.S. dollar LVPSs do not sufficiently 
overlap those of Asian financial centers. Fedwire and CHIPS 
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hours. The European systems have had less of a need to do so 
because their operating hours already overlap those of Asian 
financial centers by a few hours. The overlap with current 
operating hours, however, is now wider for the U.S. dollar 
than for the euro—in spite of the more advantageous time 
differences in Europe.
Evidence from systems for which price data are available 
suggests that the cost of payments in LVPSs has declined 
rapidly. The underlying reasons are associated with regulatory 
changes, lower costs of information and communications 
technology, and perhaps competition between the public and 
private systems that operate side by side in some countries. 
These reasons are not likely to change, and the cost of making 
payments is likely to continue to fall.
The final trend we discussed was the standardization of 
large-value payments systems through the use of common 
standards. The “Core Principles for Systemically Important 
Payment Systems” is already widely accepted and will continue 
to be applied around the world. 78 Global Trends in Large-Value Payments








(2005, in Billions 
of U.S. Dollars)
Belgium Electronic Large-Value Interbank 
Payments System  ELLIPSa 1996 1,800 21,448
Canada Large-Value Transfer System LVTS 1999 4,600 30,321
France Transferts Banque de France TBFa 1997 4,300 151,425
France Paris Net Settlement PNS 1999 6,800 19,432
Germany RTGSplus RTGSplusa 2001 35,800 172,023
Hong Kong HK Dollar Clearing House Automated 
   Transfer System HKD CHATS 1996 4,100 14,936
Hong Kong U.S. Dollar Clearing House Automated
   Transfer System USD CHATS 2000 1,500 1,588
Hong Kong Euro Clearing House Automated 
   Transfer System Euro CHATS 2003 1,000 422
Italy BI-REL BI-REL1 1997 10,400 40,840
Japan BoJ-NET Funds Transfer System BoJ-NET 1988 5,300 196,452
Netherlands TOP TOPa 1997 4,700 38,126
Singapore Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)
   Electronic Payments System MEPS 1998 2,500 7,564
Sweden K-RIX K-RIX 1990 1,500 14,867
Sweden E-RIX E-RIXa 1999 1,000 279
Switzerland Swiss Interbank Clearing SIC 1987 256,400 32,956
Switzerland EuroSIC EuroSIC 1999 9,130 630
United Kingdom CHAPS Sterling CHAPS Sterling 1984 29,600 94,299
United Kingdom CHAPS Euro CHAPS EURO1 1999 5,100 66,859
United States Fedwire Funds Service Fedwire 1918 123,400 518,547
United States Clearing House Interbank Payments System CHIPS 1970 71,500 349,871
European Union Trans-European Automated Real-time
   Gross settlement Express Transfer system TARGET 1999 76,200 607,254
European Union EURO1 EURO1 1999 46,400 53,334
European Union ECB Payment Mechanism EPMa 1999 41 5
International Continuous Linked Settlement Bank CLS Bankb 2002 47,900 785,300
Notes: In this article, we analyze the European TARGET system but do not consider its components (ELLIPS, TBF, RTGSplus, BI-REL, and TOP). 
CPSS is Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems.
 
a The system is a component of TARGET, which consists of fifteen national real-time gross settlement systems and the EPM system 
of the European Central Bank. 
b CLS Bank data are based on the aggregation of both sides of a foreign exchange transaction.
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Share of Values Transferred by TARGET Components
















TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross 
settlement Express Transfer system) is the RTGS system for the 
euro, owned and operated by the Eurosystem. It went live in 
January 1999. The system is used for the settlement of central 
bank operations, large-value euro interbank transfers, and 
other euro payments. TARGET was created by interconnecting 
national euro RTGS systems and the European Central Bank 
payment mechanism. 
Within TARGET, the two largest components—the 
German RTGSplus and the French TBF—process more than 
half of the values transacted. The next three largest systems—
the United Kingdom’s CHAPS Euro, the Italian BI-REL, and 
the Dutch TOP—process another quarter of transfer values, 
while the remaining ten smaller components are responsible 
for the remaining quarter or less.
The decentralized infrastructure of TARGET is being 
replaced by TARGET2, which is based on a single technical 
platform. TARGET2 went live in November 2007. All 
Eurosystem central banks and Kronos Euro will participate in 
the new system. E-RIX discontinued operations on January 1, 
2007, and CHAPS Euro will not connect to TARGET2.
Appendix B: TARGET and TARGET280 Global Trends in Large-Value Payments
In 2006, TARGET processed on average 326,000 payments a 
day worth about ¤ 2.1 trillion. Inter-member state or cross-
border payments accounted for 23 percent of the volume and 
35 percent of the value of payments transferred (see table). 
Not surprisingly, the cross-border flow of payments within 
TARGET correlates with economic output and the size of the 
financial sectors across countries. The geographical network of 
payment flows in Europe is shown in the exhibit. Data are from 
1999-2002 and hence exclude some of the newer accession 
countries. The size of each node is proportional to the value 
of intra-border or domestic payment flows, and the width of 
links between countries is proportional to the value of cross-
border flows. The largest flows are between the three largest 
economies: Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. 
Although the United Kingdom has not yet adopted the euro, 
it has a prominent role in cross-border euro payment flows. 
This simply reflects the importance of London as a financial 
center. Interestingly, euro payment flows within the United 
Kingdom are minuscule in comparison. In contrast, the value 
of cross-border payments to and from Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal is less than the countries’ respective shares of EU gross 
domestic product. The opposite is true for the Benelux 
countries, all of which host important financial centers 
(light blue lines). 
Appendix C: Cross-Border Payments in TARGET
















Inter-member state 725 35 75 23













Sources: <http://www.ecb.int>; Rosati and Secola (2006).
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